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ABSTRACT 
In the wake of scandals about the radicalization of hate groups 
online, Germany passed the Network Enforcement Act (“NetzDG”) to 
prevent hate speech online. In the months after NetzDG went into effect, 
social media platforms began engaging in overcorrection of hate 
speech online. This includes censorship and a new commitment to 
adhering to the strictest speech laws. In response, German and global 
citizens alike have answered with backlash against the rise of 
censorship in Europe. Despite this, Germany continues to stand by its 
laws as a steadfast protection of the rights and dignity of the German 
people. The conflict of these protections finds itself in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, particularly Article 19. The 
Human Rights Council has called into question NetzDG, arguing that 
the measure violates the freedom of expression. This Note will review 
the Network Enforcement Act for violations of freedom of expression 
law. After thorough analysis, this Note will suggest remedies to correct 
any potential violations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In January of 2018, Beatrix von Storch found herself under 
investigation for inciting hate speech on Twitter.1 She also found 
herself and her colleague Alice Weidel temporarily blocked from the 
platform.2 The women, both members of Germany’s far right 
Alternative for Germany (“AfD”) party, had condemned the Cologne 
police for tweeting a New Year’s greeting in Arabic.3 Twitter removed 
the tweets within twenty-four hours, stating that each was manifestly 
unlawful.4 In the same fell swoop, Twitter removed several tweets from 
the satirical magazine Titanic that had parodied von Storch and Weidel 
for their regressive views on Islam.5 Despite criticism, the offending 
tweets stayed down.6 
 
1.  Linda Kestler, Germany’s Attempt to Fix Facebook Is Backfiring, ATLANTIC (May 18, 
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/05/germany-facebook-afd/
560435/ [https://perma.cc/VBE9-P2W6]. An English translation of the tweet reads: “What the 
hell is going on in this country? Why is an official police page from NRW tweeting in Arabic? 
Do you think you’ll appease the barbarian, Muslim, gang-raping hordes of men?” Shona Gosh, 
Germany’s Strict New Law About Hate Speech Has Already Claimed Its First Victim, BUS. 
INSIDER (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/germany-is-investigating-far-right-
mp-beatrix-von-storch-after-a-strict-social-media-hate-speech-law-2018-1 
[https://perma.cc/VK27-ESBV]. 
2. Gosh, supra note 1. 
3. Kestler, supra note 1. 
4. Kestler, supra note 1. 
5. Attila Mong, As German Hate Speech Law Sinks Titanic Twitter Post, Critics Warn 
New Powers Go Too Far, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Jan. 23, 2018), 
https://cpj.org/blog/2018/01/as-german-hate-speech-law-sinks-titanics-twitter-p.php 
[https://perma.cc/ND67-ZN8X]; Kestler, supra note 1. 
6.  Kestler, supra note 1. 
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Twitter removed these German tweets as part of its enforcement 
of Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz (“NetzDG”).7 The law has gained 
notoriety as the most comprehensive response to the problems of 
radicalization on social media yet enacted in a democratic country.8 
Under NetzDG, Germany compels social media platforms to remove 
any content deemed unlawful within seven days of its appearance 
online.9 For content that is “manifestly unlawful,” platforms have 
twenty-four hours to remove the content.10 Non-compliance with these 
terms could make platforms criminally liable for up to EU€5 million.11 
In fear of NetzDG, social media platforms have overcorrected the 
hate speech crisis on the internet. Germany began enforcing NetzDG 
in January of 2018, yet there is a very small amount of reported 
content.12 However, according to Facebook’s transparency report in 
July 2018, the networking site had deleted over two million posts in six 
months worldwide.13 In response, the German population has 
documented exactly which posts Facebook is removing.14 While some 
of the removed posts could be manifested hate speech, arguably like 
Beatrix von Storch’s tweet about Muslims, others are valuable artistic 
and political critiques, such as Titanic’s tweets satirizing the 
exchanges. 
NetzDG raises the issue of whether or not Germany is violating 
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR” or “the Covenant”).15 Article 19 guarantees freedom of 
 
7. Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz [NetzDG] [Network Enforcement Act], July 12, 2017, 
available at https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzgebungsverfahren/Dokumente/NetzDG_
engl.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2 [https://perma.cc/D8MY-5ASG] [hereinafter NetzDG]. 
8. Germany: Flawed Social Media Law, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 14, 2018), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/14/germany-flawed-social-media-law 
[https://perma.cc/325N-6QQR]; Germany Looks to Revise Social Media Law as Europe 
Watches, CNBC (Mar. 8, 2018, 6:30 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/08/germany-looks-
to-revise-social-media-law-as-europe-watches.html [https://perma.cc/2MPZ-AD2A]. 
9. NetzDG, supra note 7, § 3 no. 2.3. 
10. Id. § 3 no. 2.2. 
11. Id. § 4 no. 2. 
12. Reporters Without Borders, The Network Enforcement Act Apparently Leads to 
Excessive Blocking of Content, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS (Aug. 3, 2018), 
https://rsf.org/en/news/network-enforcement-act-apparently-leads-excessive-blocking-content 
[https://perma.cc/F92A-XQ9U]. 
13. Id. 
14. FACEBOOK – SPERRE [FACEBOOK WALL OF SHAME], https://facebook-sperre.
steinhoefel.de/ [https://perma.cc/45S4-5T74]. 
15. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19, G.A. Res. 2200A, at 
49, U.N. Doc A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
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expression, but explicitly carves out an exception for speech targeted 
at another person’s dignity.16 However, NetzDG overregulates what 
should be a very narrowly tailored provision.17 The law thus has a 
chilling effect on political speech, and censorship is a real risk.18 
In June of 2017, David Kaye, Special Rapporteur of the 
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression, issued a mandate expressing concern over Germany’s most 
recent law regulating internet speech.19 Germany in turn responded to 
Kaye’s letter by defending its legislation.20 It argued that such 
measures were necessary in the wake of the fake news era,21 Russian 
interference in foreign elections through social media, and rampant 
radicalization of hate groups online.22 Indeed, much of Germany’s new 
law is consistent with prior hate speech legislation deemed acceptable 
by the Human Rights Committee (“HRC”).23 Ultimately, this law is 
 
16. Id. 
17. See infra Section III.B. 
18. See Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship 
Creep, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1048 (2018) (referencing NetzDG as part of the scope 
of greater censorship on the internet in Europe). 
19. See Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right of Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, Letter dated June 1, 2017 from the Special Rapporteur to the Federal 
Government of Germany, U.N. Doc. OL/DEU/1/2017 (June 1, 2017). 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/Legislation/OL-DEU-1-2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7WNL-ML9A] [hereinafter Kaye Letter]. 
20. German Government response to the Special Rapporteur (Aug. 9, 2017), 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/Legislation/GermanyReply9Aug2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8K9B-3YC8] [hereinafter German Kaye Response]. 
21. “Fake news” refers to the phenomenon of false, uncorroborated information spreading 
around the internet. This misinformation can have disastrous consequences. Shankar Vendatam 
et al., Fake News: An Origin Story, NPR (June 28, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/25/
623231337/fake-news-an-origin-story [https://perma.cc/S3KE-SYFS]. For example, there was 
an online theory that Hillary Clinton was running a child sex traffic ring underneath a pizzeria. 
Marc Fisher et al., Pizzagate: From Rumor, To Hashtag, To Gunfire In D.C., WASH. POST (Dec. 
6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/pizzagate-from-rumor-to-hashtag-to-gunfire-
in-dc/2016/12/06/4c7def50-bbd4-11e6-94ac-3d324840106c_story.html?utm_term=.
4e3d4f24821a [https://perma.cc/X63G-MMDQ]. A man who believed this “fake news” opened 
fire on the pizzeria in question. Id. But see Jessica Stone-Erdman, Just the (Alternative) Facts, 
Ma’am: The Status of Fake News Under the First Amendment, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 410, 
412 (2017) (discussing the dangers of Trump devaluing journalism). 
22. Id. 
23. See Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107, 
1118 (2011) (asserting the ICCPR values dignity as a human right). See generally Ryan 
Kraski, Combating Fake News in Social Media: U.S. and German Legal Approaches, 91 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 923, 931, 939 (2017) (arguing that Germany’s social media policies are driven 
by the civil right of dignity). 
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Germany’s attempt to curtail the ominous effects of the 
“disinformation wars” perpetuating over the internet.24 
This Note will outline NetzDG’s violations of international 
human rights law, but also reiterate that that is not the end of the 
discussion. NetzDG is a potentially powerful tool to fight the onslaught 
of radicalization online; thus, it is important to acknowledge its 
successes and strive to preserve them. Part II of this Note examines 
how international human rights law operates in relation to speech.25 
Part III of this Note outlines the reasons for NetzDG, as well as its place 
amongst German hate speech law.26 Part IV of this Note analyzes 
NetzDG’s problems with proportionality, contrasted with the important 
protections it strives to bring.27 Part V of this Note briefly compares 
Germany’s efforts to protect users from online hate speech to the 
failures in the United States to protect users from the same.28 Finally, 
Part VI suggests ways in which Germany could narrow NetzDG, 
collaborate with social media platforms, and set an example for how to 
best deal with hate speech on the internet and protect the rights of its 
own citizens.29 
II. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE INTERNET 
In order to determine whether NetzDG is in violation of 
international human rights law, it is important to understand the 
foundations of international freedom of expression guarantees. Section 
II.A explains some of the enforcement mechanisms available under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, particularly 
Germany’s commitment to it.30 Section II.B evaluates Article 19 and 
its limitations amongst the other articles.31 Section II.C explores the 
particular emphasis the HRC recently placed on the internet in relation 
to international human rights.32 
 
24. Waging War with Disinformation, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 25, 2018), 
https://www.economist.com/special-report/2018/01/25/waging-war-with-disinformation 
[https://perma.cc/BR73-NS5T]. 
25. See infra Part II. 
26. See infra Part III. 
27. See infra Part IV. 
28. See infra Part V. 
29. See infra Part VI. 
30. See infra Section II.A. 
31. See infra Section II.B. 
32. See infra Section II.C. 
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A. German Compliance with Article 19 of the ICCPR 
The ICCPR is a treaty that governs most of international human 
rights law across multiple continents.33 Entered into force in 1976, the 
ICCPR provides expansive protections for dignity, liberty, and the right 
to life.34 As of August 2017, there are 172 signing parties to the ICCPR. 
The ICCPR primarily operates through the countries that enforce 
it.35 This approach is called “domestic primacy.”36 Article 2(2) of the 
ICCPR provides language granting states the discretion to implement 
the covenant into their own laws.37 This means that like many other 
international treaties, the ICCPR relies on nations to incorporate the 
terms of the treaty into their own domestic laws.38 For example, the 
United States implements Article 19 through the First Amendment to 
its constitution,39 New Zealand incorporated the ICCPR itself into its 
own bill of rights,40 and Germany expressly incorporated the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights into its constitution.41 This is to prevent 
overreach into the sovereignty of states. Thus, each of these states 
provides a mechanism for private citizens to enforce their own rights 
under their national law.42 
Despite the deferential nature of international human rights law, 
the ICCPR provides ample mechanisms for enforcement on a global 
 
33. ICCPR, supra note 15. 
34. Douglas Donoho, Human Rights Enforcement in the Twenty-First Century, 35 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 25 (2006). 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 15. 
37. ICCPR, supra note 15, art. 2(2) (“Where not already provided for by existing 
legislative or other measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the 
necessary steps . . . to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to 
the rights recognized in the present Covenant.”). 
38. A prevalent critique of domestic primacy argues that it is too deferential to many 
countries that would fall short of providing its citizens with the full human rights protections. 
See, e.g., Ronald B. Hurdle & Walter J. Champion, Jr., ”The Life and Times of Napoleon 
Beazley: The Effect (If Any) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on 
Texas’ 17 & Up Execution Standard,” 28 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 2 (2002). 
One salient example would be the United States’ use of the death penalty on minors. 
39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 701 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
40. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (N.Z.), https://drive.google.com/file/d/
1go5yOZcZbmH4oknQs8XVxr5CI0CjkvxA/view?ts=5c9942b6 [https://perma.cc/GV68-
TPH7]. 
41. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], translation at https://www.btg-
bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf. The Declaration served as a precursor to the ICCPR. 
42. Philip Chwee, Bringing in a New Scale: Proposing a Global Metric of Internet 
Censorship, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 825, 864 (2015). 
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scale.43 The Human Rights Committee, a United Nations designated 
enforcement body,44 oversees the enforcement of these laws.45 The 
HRC requires each nation to provide it with compliance reports upon 
ratification and then any time after when the HRC so requests.46 The 
HRC will comment on each nation’s ability to provide for each right in 
the ICCPR.47 The reports must specifically reference the ways in which 
domestic law is affecting the rights in question.48 
The ICCPR also provides mechanisms for other countries to 
enforce human rights actions against each other.49 Any party to the 
Covenant may bring an action for enforcement against another party to 
the covenant.50 These actions, however, are difficult to bring because 
they require extensive procedure before the moving state may even 
bring the action.51 
The most novel tool of the ICCPR is Optional Protocol.52 Optional 
Protocol is a mechanism that allows private citizens to petition to the 
International Court of Justice for violations of their own rights.53 It is 
one of the only mechanisms by which private citizens can enforce 
international law against their own countries.54 The mechanism is not 
 
43. JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 440 
(Vicki Been et al. eds., 3d ed. 2010); JOHN CURRIE, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 377 (Irwin 
Law ed., 2001). 
44. GREGORY GISVOLD & SCOTT N. CARLSON, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 4-5 (Transnational Publishers 
2003). 
45.  Donoho, supra note 34, at 25 
46.  Donoho, supra note 34, at 17 n.47. 
47. ICCPR, supra note 15, art. 40(4) (“The Committee shall study the reports submitted 
by the States Parties to the present Covenant.”); see also GISVOLD & CARLSON, supra note 44, 
at 5-6. 
48. ICCPR, supra note 15, art. 40(4) (“Reports shall indicate the factors and difficulties, 
if any, affecting the implementation of the present Covenant.”). 
49. GISVOLD & CARLSON, supra note 44, at 12-13. 
50. Id. 
51.  Article 41 of the ICCPR articulates the process by which a state may use Article 40.    
See ICCPR, supra note 15, art. 41. 
52. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 33 on Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion 
and Expression, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/33 (Nov. 5, 2008), 
https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/CCPR.C.GC.33.pdf [https://perma.cc/3D4B-
L5YC]; see also Antoine L. Collins, Caging the Bird Does Not Cage the Song: How the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Fails to Protect Free Expression over the 
Internet, 21 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 371, 383 (2003).  
53.  Collins, supra note 52, 383; Donoho, supra note 34, at 25. 
54.  Collins, supra note 52, at 383. 
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a perfect one,55 but it can be a powerful tool for individuals to vindicate 
their rights in against a country in violation.56 
While some countries have been inconsistent with their 
compliance,57 Germany remains committed to providing 
comprehensive proof of its compliance to human rights norms.58 
Indeed, Germany willingly participates in Optional Protocol.59 This is 
an affirmative commitment that German citizens will have recourse if 
their rights are violated.60 Germany’s submission is one of many 
indications of Germany’s dedication to protecting the human rights of 
its citizens.61 
Germany is also subject to international human rights law through 
the European Court of Human Rights.62 Specifically, Europe protects 
freedom of expression through the European Convention on Human 
Rights (“ECHR”).63 Article 10 of the ECHR has very similar language 
as Article 19 of the ICCPR.64 
 
55. In order to bring an action against a country under Optional Protocol, a country must 
have opted in to the procedure. See Chwee, supra note 45, at 831. Thus far, of the 160 ratifying 
parties to the ICCPR, only 111 have opted in to Optional Protocol. 
56. See GISVOLD & CARLSON, supra note 44, at 9-10. 
57. See, e.g., Hurdle & Champion, Jr., supra note 38, at 6 (noting the failure of the United 
States to comply with the ICCPR’s ban on executing minors). See also DUNOFF, supra note 43, 
at 443. 
58. Participants of the ICCPR’s Optional Protocol, United Nations Treaty Collection, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
5&chapter=4&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/48JA-HA2P]. 
59.  Id. 
60.  Donoho, supra note 34, at 25. 
61. Many eligible countries have not assented to Optional Protocol. Participants of the 
ICCPR’s Optional Protocol, supra note 58. Further, a person must prove that he or she has 
exhausted “all domestic remedies” before he or she may pursue Optional Protocol. 
62. JAN OSTER, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA LAW 29 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 2017). To an extent, the European Court of Justice also protects the fundamental rights of 
Europeans. See ELISA RAVASI, HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION BY THE ECTHR AND THE ECJ 
(Brill Nijhoff ed., 2017). 
63. The ECtHR and ECJ has had success with regional implementation of human rights 
law. Donoho, supra note 34, at 44. 
64. Compare ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 19(2) (“Everyone shall have the right to freedom 
of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas 
of all kinds regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or 
through any other media of his choice.”) with Article 10 of the Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R., 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/8F2M-FLGU] 
(“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers.”) [hereinafter ECHR]. See also Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, art. 11(1) (“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This 
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Germany does exhibit some concerning behavior on matters of 
freedom of expression,65 but has proven itself sensitive to public 
backlash and questions of its human rights reputation. In 2016, satirist 
Jan Böhmermann published a poem about Turkish President Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan online.66 Among other things, the poem made fun of 
Erdoğan’s genitalia and said that he had sexual relations with goats.67 
The speech technically violated Section 103 of Germany’s criminal 
code, which outlaws insulting foreign leaders.68 Erdoğan demanded 
action from the German government, and, in a controversial move, 
Chancellor Angela Merkel approved a criminal prosecution against the 
comedian.69 
The jump to criminal prosecution under archaic speech law 
exhibits extreme measures against predominantly innocuous offenses. 
The poem did not incite violence or use racial slurs.70 It was, however, 
mostly a thorny, rude attack on a somewhat thin-skinned foreign 
leader.71 If anything, this was Böhmermann’s attempt to critique 
German slander law.72 
 
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority regardless of frontiers.”). 
65. See, e.g., David Shimer, Germany Raids Homes of 36 People Accused of Hateful 
Postings Over Social Media, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/
20/world/europe/germany-36-accused-of-hateful-postings-over-social-media.html (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2019). 
66. Alison Smale, Comedian’s Takedown of Turkish President Tests Free Speech in 
Germany, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/12/world/europe/
jan-bohmermann-erdogan-neo-magazin-royale.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2019). 
67.  Dr. Manfred Dauster, The German Court System in Combatting State Security 
Matters, in Particular Terrorism, 42 S. ILL. U. L.J. 31, 54 (2017). The poem has not been 
translated into English, but a German copy can be found here: Justiz-Portal, HAMBURG,DE, 
http://justiz.hamburg.de/contentblob/6103298/6b1b7ae264e23809630af9d7716ef2fd/data/sch
maehgedicht-jan-boehmermann- pdfanhang.pdf [https://perma.cc/HVN8-AZ8A]. 
68.  STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], §103 http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#p1035 [https://perma.cc/A6EV-LPWZ]. 
(“Whosoever insults a foreign head of state . . . shall be liable to imprisonment . . . or a fine . . . 
in a case of a slanderous insult to imprisonment from three months to five years.”). 
69.  Ashley Cowburn, Angela Merkel Accepts Turkish Request to Seek Prosecution of 
German Comedian, POLITICO (Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/
europe/angela-merkel-accepts-turkish-request-to-seek-prosecution-of-german-comedian-
a6985686.html [https://perma.cc/9EK2-685X]. 
70. See Jan Böhmermann Erdogan Poem, VIMEO, https://vimeo.com/163537121 
[https://perma.cc/6QPE-GEG3]. 
71. Konstantin Richter, Is Jan Böhmermann Funny?, POLITICO (Apr. 27, 2016), 
https://www.politico.eu/article/is-jan-bohmermann-funny/ [https://perma.cc/4FRK-BLDS]. 
72. Id. 
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The backlash to the “Böhmermann affair” was immediate and 
sharp.73 Many criticized Merkel for enacting prosecution,74 while many 
more questioned why a democratic country such as Germany could 
have a law that criminalized insulting foreign leaders.75 Eventually, the 
Human Rights Watch even expressed its concern about the censorship 
implications of Böhmermann’s arrest.76 
These critiques did not fall on deaf ears. Germany eventually 
dropped the prosecution against Böhmermann.77 That next year, 
Germany’s parliament repealed the law, attempting to fix some of the 
damage it had done.78 There remained one troubling piece, however: a 
civil law suit aimed at Böhmermann sought to prevent him from 
repeating the poem.79 The suit successfully barred him from repeating 
all but six lines of the poem.80 
In international law, such measures must be considered. Silencing 
of citizens must be considered a matter of public safety and 
wellbeing.81 Böhmermann’s arrest provides proof that Germany has 
 
73. Justin Huggler, Merkel Faces Backlash After Collapse of Case Against German 
Comedian for Insulting Erdogan, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 5, 2016), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/2016/10/05/merkel-faces-backlash-after-collapse-of-case-against-german-come/ 
[https://perma.cc/8GXV-PFPQ]. 
74. Stefan Kuzmany, Merkel Falls Flat Over a Satirical Poem, SPEIGEL (Apr. 12, 2016), 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-erdogan-affair-poses-serious-threat-to-
merkel-power-a-1086813.html [https://perma.cc/878K-PTB4]. 
75. Lizzie Dearden, Erdogan Poem: Court bans German comedian Jan Böhmermann from 
repeating controversial verses, INDEPENDENT (May 18, 2016), https://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/europe/erdogan-poem-court-bans-german-comedian-jan-boehmermann-from-
repeating-sexual-verses-a7035896.html [https://perma.cc/BT3E-HUVY]. 
76.  Germany: Prosecuting Satirists Mocks Freedom of Speech, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 
16, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/16/germany-prosecuting-satirist-mocks-
freedom-speech [https://perma.cc/7P4E-FQD4]. 
77. Associated Press, German Prosecutors Drop Probe of Comedian Over Insulting 
Turkish President, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-german-
comedian-dropped-investigation-20161004-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/R69C-JPAM]. 
78. Katie Forster, Germany abolishes law that bans insulting foreign leaders, 
INDEPENDENT (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-
law-insulting-foreign-leaders-erdogan-jan-boehmermann-comedian-sketch-outdated-lifts-ban-
a7546341.html [https://perma.cc/4GAY-9YSJ]. 
79. Uri Friedman, The Thinnest Skinned President in the World, ATLANTIC (Apr. 26, 
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/04/turkey-germany-erdogan-
bohmermann/479814/ [https://perma.cc/KYE6-WVVH]. 
80. Alison Smale, German Comedian Is Told Not to Repeat Lewd Lines About Erdogan, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/10/world/europe/jan-
bohmermann-recep-tayyip-erdogan-poem.html [https://perma.cc/L3EC-6EWC]. 
81. JOHANN BAIR, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 
AND ITS (FIRST) OPTIONAL PROTOCOL 91 (Peter Lang GmbH ed., 2005). 
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been non-compliant on its Article 19 duties, but the subsequent repeal 
of the law and dismissal of the prosecution shows Germany as a 
country committed, even if only for the public opinion, to compliance 
with human rights law. 
B. Article 19 and Its Limitations 
Article 19 has given birth to confusing doctrine on freedom of 
expression.82 The freedom of expression doctrine is necessarily marred 
by different values in different countries. As the European Court of 
Justice (“ECJ”) noted extreme examples of differing speech values: 
“Saudi Arabia does not allow criticism of its leadership nor questioning 
of Islamic beliefs; Singapore bans speech that ‘denigrates Muslims and 
Malays;’ and Thailand prohibits insults to the monarchy. Expression 
supporting gay rights authored by a European writer for a European 
audience violates the law in Russia.”83 International law compensates 
for differing values by providing flexibility to states to decide which 
speech to regulate.84 
This is not to say that the HRC does not value freedom of 
expression.85 On the contrary, it is considered one of the most 
fundamental rights to human beings.86 This makes any inquiry into 
freedom of expression complicated because it is simultaneously 
incredibly important to defer to nation’s evaluations of speech while 
also crucial to treat restrictions on valuable speech with scrutiny.87 
Article 19(2) reads: “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive, and impart 
information and ideas of all kinds regardless of frontiers, either orally, 
in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of 
his choice.”88 Over the years, the HRC has interpreted Article 19(2) to 
mean that Article 19(2) protects the liberal political ideals of freedom 
of speech and expression.89 The HRC also generally interprets Article 
 
82. GISVOLD & CARLSON, supra note 46, at 119. 
83. See Case C-507/17, CNIL v. Google ¶. 20. 
84. Citron, supra note 18, at 1063. 
85. Oster, supra note 62, at 40. 
86. See id. at 40-41 (describing the value of freedom of expression in different democratic 
countries). 
87. Bair, supra note 81, at 91. 
88. ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 19(2). 
89. Collins, supra note 52, at 389. 
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19 to dictate that any limitation on speech or expression must be narrow 
and justifiable.90 
In determining whether a law falls within the confines of Article 
19, the Human Rights Committee has established a three-part 
proportionality test. Under this framework, the HRC considers (1) 
whether the interference was suitable to achieve the legitimate aim 
pursued;91 (2) whether the interference was the least intrusive 
instrument among those which might achieve the legitimate aim;92 and 
(3) whether the interference was strictly proportionate to the legitimate 
aim pursued.93 The test is similar to the American Supreme Court’s 
“strict scrutiny” test, albeit somewhat more lenient.94 
Article 19(3) acts as a natural limitation on Article 19(2).95 Article 
19(3) allows for restrictions on speech that violate the rights of others 
or threaten national security or public order.96 It also carves out 
restrictions based on morality.97 Thus, in order to deprive someone of 
his or her right to free expression, a government must prove that one of 
these factors is crucially at play.98 
A somewhat extreme illustration of Article 19(3)’s narrow 
limitation is Alberto Grille Motta v. Uruguay.99 In this case, Uruguay 
arrested Motto for his connections to the communist party.100 The 
Uruguayan government was unable to provide evidence that Motto’s 
political dissent was a threat to the public.101 The International Court 
 
90.  Collins, supra note 52, at 389. 
91. Oster, supra note 62, at 69. 
92.  Oster, supra note 62, at 69. 
93. Oster, supra note 62, at 69; see also Human Rights Committee, Ballantyne and others 
v. Canada [1993] Communication no. 359, 385/389 [11.4]. 
94. Despite Supreme Court protest, many legal scholars consider strict scrutiny “strict in 
theory, but fatal in fact.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 202 (1995). 
95. ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 19(3) (“The exercise of the rights provided for in [19(2)] 
of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to 
certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) 
For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) for the protection of national security or of 
public order . . . or of public health or morals.”). 
96. See ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 19(3). See also Bair, supra note 77, at 91. 
97. ICCPR, supra note 15, art. 19(3). 
98.  Bair, supra note 81, at 92 (stating limitations on free expression must “be shown as 
necessary and proportionate to the goal in question and not arbitrary.”). 
99. See Alberto Grille Motto v. Uruguay, Selected Decisions Under Optional Protocol, ¶¶ 
54-57, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/SelDec_1_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8AEX-4TY4]. 
100. Id. ¶ 16. 
101. Id. 
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of Justice found that subversive association allegations were not 
sufficiently narrow to justify Motta’s arrest.102 
Article 20 is another limitation on Article 19.103 Article 20 limits 
hate speech or speech that incites violence.104 Finally, Article 17 
protects people from “unlawful attacks on [their] honor or 
reputation.”105 Countries in Europe tend to use dignity interests to 
justify their laws limiting speech.106 However, the ICCPR has been 
interpreted by the HRC to be limited in this scope.107 Predominantly, 
limits on hate speech must truly only limit hate speech.108 This is 
problematic because there is no universal definition of hate speech, thus 
there is no way for government to know exactly what may be 
censored.109 
C. Freedom of Expression on the Internet 
International bodies invested in human rights law have shown 
particular interest in protecting free speech on the internet.110 In fact, 
 
102. Id. 
103. Johann Bair, supra note 81, at 96. 
104. See ICCPR, supra note 15, art. 20(2) (“Any advocacy of national, racial or religious 
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by 
law. . . .”). 
105.  ICCPR, supra note 15, art. 17(2). This Note primarily focuses on Article 19. Id. art. 
19. 
106. See, e.g., Jennifer Daskal, Speech Without Borders: The Rise (And Risk) of Global 
Censorship Online (2018) (on file with the author) (detailing an Austrian case where Facebook 
was compelled to take down posts referring to a Green Party candidate for her dignity). 
107. Bair, supra note 81, at 93-94. 
108.  Bair, supra note 81, at 93-94. 
109. Roger Kiska, Hate Speech: A Comparison Between the European Court of Human 
Rights and the United States Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 107, 111 
(2013). 
110. See Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Fifth Annual Report, General Assembly, 
U.N. Doc. A/70/371 (Sept. 18, 2015) (by Ben Emmerson); Special Rapporteur on the Promotion 
and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Human Rights Council, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/29/32 (May 22, 2015) (by David Kaye); Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, General 
Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/69/397 (Sept. 23, 2014) (by Ben Emmerson); Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Human Rights 
Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/40 (Apr. 17, 2013) (by Frank La Rue); Special Rapporteur on 
the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Human Rights 
Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/27 (May 16, 2011) (by Frank La Rue); Special Rapporteur on 
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering 
Terrorism, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/37 (Dec. 28, 2009) (by Martin 
Scheinin). 
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there are many indicators that the HRC has taken affirmative steps to 
prioritize free expression on the internet. On the other hand, European 
human rights law has taken aims at protecting a different right on the 
internet at any cost: dignity. This portion of this Note will observe the 
different initiatives under both International and European Human 
Rights law. 
1. The HRC and Online Speech 
The internet era presents unprecedented technology that has led to 
unprecedented questions.111 As far as it creates a novel ability to spread 
information, many scholars equate the invention to that of the printing 
press.112 Like the printing press, the internet exponentially increased 
the ease of information flow.113 Now more than ever, people have the 
entire wealth of knowledge of the world at their fingertips.114 The HRC 
recognizes this, and has taken this new technology in stride.115 
Former Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Promotion and 
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank 
La Rue, made it a priority to define the rights of Article 19 in particular 
as crucial in defining Human Rights on the Internet.116 In particular, he 
released HRC General Comment Number 34, which was a mandate 
creating an obligation on countries to protect the human being’s right 
to the internet under Article 19 of the ICCPR.117 The report was a firm 
clarification of the need to protect the internet as a matter of human 
rights: “facilitating access to the Internet for all individuals, with as 
little restriction to online content as possible, should be a priority for 
all States.”118 
The Special Rapporteur is deemed a “scholar,” or someone who 
gathers information on behalf of the citizens of the world so that their 
 
111. Kraski, supra note 23, at 924. 
112. Collins, supra note 52, at 373. 
113.  Collins, supra note 52, at 373. 
114.  Collins, supra note 52, at 373. 
115.  Collins, supra note 52, at 373. 
116. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, Human Rights 
Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/27 (May 16, 2011) (by Frank La Rue). 
117. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 34 on Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion 
and Expression, ¶15, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sep. 12, 2011). 
118. Id. 
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rights may be enforced.119 This is a history that dates back to the 
formation of the Human Rights Council in 2006.120 While there is not 
an official mechanism of the Special Rapporteur to prosecute any 
country, the word of the Special Rapporteur is seen to have some 
authority on interpretations of human rights law.121 
In 2011, Special Rapporteur LaRue explicitly expanded Article 
19 to include discourse over the internet.122 He explicitly stated that the 
Committee would have even more cause for concern for restrictions on 
political speech, including the following language: “the mere fact that 
forms of expression are considered to be insulting to a public figure is 
not sufficient to justify the imposition of penalties . . . .”123 
David Kaye further acknowledged the problematic role of Internet 
Service Platforms in this process.124 “Private intermediaries are 
typically ill-equipped to make determinations of content 
illegality . . . .”125 The HRC disincentivizes legislation that forces 
intermediaries to make arbitrary determinations about the illegality of 
a post.126 
LaRue’s report acknowledges Article 19(3), but also emphasizes 
its limited scope.127 Despite the inconsistencies of past decisions 
pertaining to Article 19(3), the HRC intends for the internet to remain 
as free a place for expression as possible.128  
 
Paragraph 3 lays down specific conditions and it is only subject to 
these conditions that restrictions may be imposed: the restrictions 
must be “provided by law;” they may only be imposed for one of 
the grounds set out in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 3; 
 
119. See HUGH THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION 17 
(1972). See also James D. Fry, Privacy, Predictability and Internet Surveillance in the U.S. and 
China: Better the Devil You Know?, 37 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 419, 431 (2015). 
120. Ved P. Nanda, The Protection of Human Rights Under International Law: Will the 
U.N. Human Rights Council and the Emerging New Norm “Responsibility to Protect” Make A 
Difference?, 35 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 353, 357 (2007); G.A. Res. 60/251, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/60/251 (Mar. 15, 2006). 
121. See Donoho, supra note 34, at 18. 
122. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 34 on Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion 
and Expression, ¶15, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sep. 12, 2011). 
123. Id. 
124. Gabor Rona & Lauren Aarons, State Responsibility to Respect, Protect and Fulfill 
Human Rights Obligations in Cyberspace, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 503, 509 (2016). 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. See Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 34, ¶¶ 12, 43. 
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and they must conform to the strict tests of necessity and 
proportionality . . . Restrictions must be applied only for those 
purposes for which they were prescribed and must be directly 
related to the specific need on which they are predicated.129 
 
Scholars expanded upon LaRue’s imagining of Article 19.130 For 
example, Professor Molly Land tied LaRue’s report to a history of 
Article 19.131 She argues that the Framers of Article 19 meant for 
expression through new technologies to be incorporated into the 
right.132 Her analysis concludes that there is no affirmative right to 
provide the internet to citizens, but that Article 19 is triggered when 
nations seek to deprive their citizens of access.133 
No item further articulates the commitment the HRC has to free 
speech on the internet like the Declaration of freedom of expression, 
released in March of 2017.134 In the document, Special Rapporteur 
David Kaye spoke explicitly of the dangers that Fake News could pose 
to freedom of expression.135 Indeed, the declaration explicitly states 
that the HRC’s strong commitment to free speech on the internet was 
directly preempting possible measures to stop fake news.136 
2. The European Union and the Right to be Forgotten 
The European Union has notably taken a different approach to 
human rights on the internet by prioritizing Data Privacy.137 The 
HRC’s primary response to concerns about the internet have been about 
censorship, while Europe recently has gone to great lengths to protect 
the “right to be forgotten.”138 
 
129. Id. at ¶ 22; see also Communication No. 1022/2001, Velichkin v. Belarus, Views 
adopted on 20 October 2005, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1022/2001 (Oct. 20, 2005). 
130. Oster, supra note 62, at 24. 
131. See Molly Land, Toward an International Law of the Internet, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
393, 426 (2013). 
132. Id. 
133. See id. (“[A]lthough there may not be a right to access Twitter per se, a decision to 
cut off access to Twitter would trigger the requirements of Article 19(3).”). 
134. Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression And “Fake News”, Disinformation and 
Propaganda, FOM.GAL/3/17, available at https://www.osce.org/fom/302796?download=true 
[https://perma.cc/KS99-PT7H] (official English version) [hereinafter Joint Declaration]. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 106 
GEO. L.J. 115, 123 (2017). 
138. Oster, supra note 62, at 54. 
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The right to be forgotten found its roots in European notions of 
dignity.139 It is, at its core, a human rights response to the internet.140 
In 2010, with the proliferation of online information, Viviane Reding 
released a statement as European Commissioner for Justice, 
Fundamental Rights, and Citizenship.141 She stated that Europeans 
would have control over what they posted online.142 So duly named, 
the right to be forgotten allows Europeans the luxury of controlling 
their own image online against defaming content.143 This right, as told 
by Land, also falls under the protections of Article 19(2).144 
The right to be forgotten can come into direct conflict with 
freedom of expression.145 It necessarily means that any content posted 
about another person is subject to the right.146 Consider, for example, 
Axel Springer AG v. Germany.147 In Axel Springer, a television actor 
had been arrested at a beer festival for possession of cocaine.148 Axel 
Springer published an article with details of the actor’s arrest.149 The 
actor sued for violations of his right to privacy and prevailed in the 
German Courts.150 The ECtHR found that Germany violated the 
newspaper’s rights to free expression.151 
Axel Springer lays out the ultimate conflict between human rights 
online. The actor has interest in keeping his dignity. The newspaper has 
an interest in informing the public on matters of general interest. These 
two human rights interests are in conflict in NetzDG as well. Germany 
 
139.  Id. 
140. Steven C. Bennett, The “Right to Be Forgotten”: Reconciling EU and US 
Perspectives, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 161, 161 (2012). 
141. See Press Release, Building Trust in Europe’s Online Single Market, June 22, 2010, 
(text of Reding speech), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=SPEECH/10/327 [https://perma.cc/T5BQ-AMAV]; see also Bennett, supra note 140, 
at 161. 
142. See Building Trust in Europe’s Online Single Market, supra note 141. 
143. See Robert C. Post, Data Privacy and Dignitary Privacy: Google Spain, the Right to 
Be Forgotten, and the Construction of the Public Sphere, 67 DUKE L.J. 981, 1046 (2018). 
144. Land, supra note 131, at, 432. 
145. See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 745 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that America 
does not recognize a right to be forgotten, and emphasizing free speech as the right at stake). 
146. Oster, supra note 62, at 73. 
147. Axel Springer Ag v. Germany, (Application no. 39954/08) [2012] App. No. 39954/08 
[89-95], https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/CASE-
OF-AXEL-SPRINGER-AG-v.-GERMANY.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DD3-SYWR] [hereinafter 
Axel Springer]. 
148.  Id.at ¶ 11. 
149. Id. at ¶ 13. 
150. Id. at ¶ 20. 
151.  Id. at ¶ 70. 
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wants to protect the rights of those even more vulnerable members of 
society than a well-known actor, at the expense of speech that is 
arguably less valuable than a factual report on an embarrassing arrest. 
Despite protecting the actor in Axel Springer, Europe has worked 
tirelessly to protect dignity online.152 In 2016, the European Union 
enacted the General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), and it went 
into force May of 2018.153 In doing so, Europe codified the right to be 
forgotten, and compelled internet platforms to delete millions of posts 
and websites.154  In 2017, the European courts dealt with Google which 
fought the compelled deletions under speech law.155 The ECJ held that 
the GDPR created an obligation for Google to hide or remove content 
from millions of users through the continent.156 Google now must 
protect the rights of millions of internet users to erase themselves from 
the internet.157 
3. American Free Speech and Internet Jurisprudence 
America has a famously robust conception of free speech. While 
the first right protected in the German Basic Law is human dignity, the 
First Amendment of the Bill of Rights protects the freedom to speak.158 
When the right to speak is implicated in any state action, any restriction 
on said right is held to the highest level of scrutiny.159 The restriction 
must be narrowly tailored to achieving a compelling state interest.160 
Over the last few decades, this right has expanded to the protections of 
many different forms of speech. Specifically, the Supreme Court seeks 
to protect political speech. Primarily, free speech doctrine holds that 
 
152. See Daskal, supra note 102, at 63. 
153.  See Post, supra note 143, at 987. 
154.  Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L119), art. 17 [hereinafter GDPR]. 
155. See Post, supra note 143, at 997. 
156. Id. 
157. Aliya Ram, Google Receives 2.4m Requests to Delete Search Results, IRISH TIMES 
(Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/google-receives-2-4m-
requests-to-delete-search-results-1.3407979 [https://perma.cc/2SSS-5S7B]. This is not to say 
the European Union does not care for Free Speech. In CNIL v. Google, the ECJ makes a 
concerted effort to balance expression and speech, favoring speech. See infra notes 364-68. 
158. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press. . . .”). 
159. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (“Because the Act 
imposes a restriction on the content of protected speech, it is invalid unless [the government] 
can demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny.”). 
160. If the speech is not protected by the First Amendment, it is subject to rational basis 
review, which is the Court’s most deferential standard of review. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973). 
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the speaker has the right to determine his or her own speech content.161 
American law also protect speech the most when it is a “public 
issue.”162 
American free speech jurisprudence also does not discriminate as 
to the content of the speech.163 To do so is considered “viewpoint 
discrimination.164 Justice Brennan referred to viewpoint discrimination 
as “censorship in its purest form” and warned that “government 
regulation that discriminates among viewpoints threatens the continued 
vitality of ‘free speech.’”165 It is in this standard that the United States 
takes the largest departure from European laws on speech. 
Like the HRC, the Supreme Court in the United States has 
attached free speech heavily to the Internet. As with all Constitutional 
rights in America, only public actors are bound by the First 
Amendment.166 This means that social media providers, as private 
companies, have the rights to restrict content on their platforms. That 
is not to say that the Supreme Court has been silent on the issues of 
speech on the Internet. On the contrary, the Supreme Court has touched 
Internet speech a few times since its inception. 
One of the earlier examples is Reno v. ACLU.167 The Court struck 
down portions of the CDA that Congress had aimed at protecting 
minors from pornography.168 Although Justice Stevens did not hold 
that the Internet is subject to any specific Internet-only protections, he 
describes it as “diverse as human thought.”169 He then summarizes that 
the Court’s precedent “provide[s] no basis for qualifying the level of 
First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium.”170  
In 2014, a court in the Southern District of New York gave a search 
 
161. Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the Content-Based/content Neutral and 
Content/viewpoint Determinations, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 595, 635 n.28 (2003). 
162. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451 (2011). 
163. Jacobs, supra note 154, at 599. 
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20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 727, 730 (2018). 
165. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 62 (1983) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting). 
166. Sharp Corp. v. Hisense USA Corp., 292 F. Supp. 3d 157, 175 (D.D.C. 2017), (“It is 
axiomatic that to elicit First Amendment protection, the infringement upon speech or petition 
rights must have arisen from state action of some kind.”), dismissed, No. 17-7158, 2017 WL 
9401061 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 26, 2017). 
167. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). 
168. Id. at 859. 
169. Id. at 870. 
170. Id. 
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engine free speech rights in its search results in Baidu.171 The court 
held that an Internet service provider has a free speech interest in its 
ability to filter search results, as an editor of the content.172 
Recently, in Packingham v. North Carolina, Justice Kennedy 
referred to the Internet as today’s public forum for ideas.173 The 
Supreme Court has not expressly held that Internet speech has more 
protection than any other speech, but the language in Packingham 
indicates that the Court hopes to keep speech on the Internet as 
unregulated as possible.174 This approach could lead to dangerous 
consequences. Justice Alito alludes to the consequences of the Court’s 
“undisciplined dicta” in his dissent.175 
4. Comparing European, International, and United States Internet 
Speech Policy 
The difference in priority between the European and International 
Law speaks to Germany’s conception of its duty to regulate the 
Internet. Germany seems to have aligned with the European conception 
of what to protect online, because the stated purpose of NetzDG is to 
protect against hate speech and fake news.176 However, as the 
international body designated to speak on human rights norms, the 
HRC has prioritized the prevention of censorship.177 As the Internet 
continues to change the world in which we live, it is important to 
 
171.  Jian Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
172. Id. Interestingly, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act specifically 
shields internet platforms for liability on their sites because they are not publishers. Thus, 
Internet companies have all the protections and none of the liability of publishers. 
173. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017). (“Social media allows 
users to gain access to information and communicate with one another about it on any subject 
that might come to mind . . . North Carolina with one broad stroke bars access to what for many 
are the principal sources for knowing current events, checking ads for employment, speaking 
and listening in the modern public square, and otherwise exploring the vast realms of human 
thought and knowledge.”). 
174. Brian P. Kane, Social Media Is the New Town Square: The Difficulty in Blocking 
Access to Public Official Accounts, 60 ADVOC. 31, 32 (2017). 
175. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
176. Linda Kinstler, Germany’s Attempt to Fix Facebook is Backfiring, ATLANTIC (May 
18, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/05/germany-facebook-afd/
560435/ [https://perma.cc/JM65-69CB]; Bernand Rohleder, Germany Set Out to Delete Hate 
Speech Online. Instead, It Only Made Things Worse, WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/02/20/netzdg/?utm_term=.58bb
3a6fb06d [https://perma.cc/6J5N-JZFN]. 
177. Joint Declaration, supra note 129. 
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understand that both rights are implicated when discussing restrictions 
on internet platforms. 
III. AN ANALYSIS OF NETZDG AND GERMAN HATE SPEECH 
LAW 
Germany claims that their law is narrowly tailored as to only 
prosecute hate speech, and that in the process they are promoting 
important human rights aims.178 Part III of this Note will explore 
Germany’s law pertaining to speech.179 Section III.A will evaluate the 
historical context for Germany’s hate speech law.180 Section III.B will 
evaluate NetzDG itself as connected to this history.181 Section III.C will 
observe Germany’s justification for the law.182 
A. Inviolable Dignity 
NetzDG is written to capture the proliferation of hate speech and 
fake news online.183 The prohibition of hate speech is consistent with 
Germany’s past laws on expression.184 Germany’s hate speech law 
derives both from ancient laws protecting “honor” and “social status” 
and laws enacted after World War II for comprehensive protection of 
minorities.185 The result is one of the most heavily regulated arenas for 
speech amongst democratic nations.186 
Germany, like the United States, protects the right of their people 
to speak freely and to be “free from censorship.”187 Germany protects 
this right in Article 5 of their Constitution.188 However, unlike its First 
 
178. German Government response to the Special Rapporteur, 8/2017, 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/Legislation/GermanyReply9Aug2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QF6X-4X6F] [hereinafter German Kaye Response]. 
179. See infra Part III. 
180. See infra Section III.A. 
181. See infra Section III.B. 
182. See infra Section III.C. 
183. See NetzDG, supra note 7. 
184. See STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] [PENAL CODE], as amended Dec. 31, 2007 (trans. by 
Michael Bohlander) (Ger.); Deborah Levine, Note, Sticks and Stones May Break My Bones, But 
Words May Also Hurt Me: A Comparison of United States and German Hate Speech Laws, 41 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1293, 1318 (2018). 
185. Levine, supra note 184. 
186. Fleming Rose, Germany’s Attack on Free Speech, CATO INST. (May 30, 2017), 
https://www.cato.org/blog/germanys-attack-free-speech [https://perma.cc/A6GE-2E6N]. 
187. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], translation at https://www.btg-
bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf [https://perma.cc/WB5D-4CWQ]. 
188. Id. 
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Amendment counterpart, Article 5 contains express carve outs for hate 
speech.189 While American jurisprudence treats hate speech with strict 
scrutiny, Germany sees hate speech as a phenomenon that should 
receive no legal protection.190 
Germany’s constitution highlights the oft cited European right to 
“dignity,”191 which comes into contact with speech online quite a bit.192 
The highest Constitutional Courts in Germany have deemed human 
dignity to be the center of all basic rights in Germany. It is Article 1 in 
their Basic Law.193 
This right diverges from the American right to privacy 
somewhat.194 James Whitman argues that this discrepancy reaches to 
the core of what each culture tries to protect.195 In continental Europe, 
matters of privacy and dignity are about the protection of one’s name, 
image, and reputation.196 In America, privacy is about freedom from 
government surveillance.197 These distinctions become clear in the 
different continental approaches towards privacy protection. For 
example, in America there is emphasis on the need for a warrant before 
the government may search your home.198 On the other hand, 
 
189. Ryan Kraski, supra note 23, at 930–31 (2017) (“These rights shall find their limits in 
the provisions of general laws . . . and in the right to personal honor.”). 
190. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], translation at https://www.btg-
bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf [https://perma.cc/WB5D-4CWQ]. 
191. Jennifer Daskal, supra note 102. 
192. Jennifer Daskal, supra note 102. 
193. DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 355 (2012) (“[T]his provision 
expresses the highest value of the Basic Law, informing the substance and spirit of the entire 
document.”). The authors also note that the clause on human dignity has served a similar purpose 
in German constitutional law that the Due Process clauses in the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments have served in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence. Id. 
194. James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 
113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1161 (2004). 
195.  Id. at 1160 (“At least as far as the law goes, we do not seem to possess general 
‘human’ intuitions about the ‘horror’ of privacy violations. We possess something more 
complicated than that: We possess American intuitions—or, as the case may be, Dutch, Italian, 
French, or German intuitions.”). 
196.  Id. at 1161. 
197.  Id. at 1161-62 (“[T]he prime danger, from the American point of view, is that the 
‘sanctity of [our] home[s]’ . . . American anxieties thus focus comparatively little on the media. 
Instead, they tend to be anxieties about maintaining a kind of private sovereignty within our own 
walls.”). 
198.  See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) (holding that a warrant is necessary 
to prevent unreasonable searches by officers who abuse the power of the law). 
1348 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42:4 
Europeans are far more accepting of government interference,199 but 
far less tolerant of defaming someone and ruining their lives.200 
The internet endangers both rights to privacy, and both continental 
Europe and America have sought to protect those rights. In 2018 in 
Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the 
government would need a warrant to access cell site data, effectively 
ruling that in the new age of the internet, privacy needed heightened 
protection from government forces.201  The Court acknowledged that 
as digital technology expanded, our notions of it was important to 
protect citizens from government surveillance.202  Given the amount of 
data that internet platforms accumulate, allowing the government 
unencumbered access to that data would give the government the 
ability to track all citizens at any given point.203 
The right to one’s control over one’s personal image is a 
recognized right throughout Europe, and subtly diverges from the right 
to privacy.204 NetzDG can promote this goal for the large portion of 
private citizens affected by online harassment, many who are not public 
figures and should be legally protected from a large amount of online 
hate speech and defamation. 
Germany’s law on free speech is particularly tied to the ethics of 
the speech itself.205 Lüth was the pivotal case on Germany’s freedom 
of expression.206 Harlan, a Nazi propagandist filmmaker, escaped the 
mass of criminal penalty that followed World War II.207 He made an 
effort after the war to recreate a career for himself.208 Luth, appalled by 
Harlan’s reemergence in decent society, organized a boycott of the 
film.209 Harlan sued Luth for an injunction against the boycott.210 After 
initially losing at the trial level and on appeal, Lüth appealed to the 
 
199.  See Whitman, supra note 194, at 1216 (describing European laws where a 
government has control over ability to name a baby). 
200.  Id. at 1155-56. 
201. 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018).  
202.  Id.  
203. Id. (“The Government's position fails to contend with the seismic shifts in digital 
technology that made possible the tracking of not only Carpenter's location but also everyone 
else's, not for a short period but for years and years.”). 
204. Whitman, supra note 194, at 1161. 
205. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 441. 
206. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 442. 
207. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 442. 
208.  KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 442. 
209.  KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 442. 
210. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 443. 
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Federal Constitutional Court, claiming that his rights to free speech 
under Article 5 had been violated.211 The court held in favor of Lüth, 
holding that Constitutional decisions did not exist in a vacuum.212 They 
found Luth’s good faith effort to prevent a Nazi from reemerging in the 
public eye outweighed any claim Harlan had to his future career.213 
The court took a decidedly less sympathetic stance towards a 
political boycott in Blinkfüer.214 Blinkfüer, a small, pro-communist 
newspaper, sought distribution of their writing throughout shops in 
Germany.215 A far larger newspaper, Axel Springer, essentially 
blacklisted Blinkfüer by threatening to pull its products from many 
stores carrying the smaller magazine.216 In the Blinkfüer decision, the 
court waxed poetic about the importance of intellectual debate in 
democracy.217 The court even went so far as to distinguish the case and 
hand from Lüth: “Lüth’s call for a boycott was simply an appeal to the 
moral and political responsibility of his audience . . . .”218 A movement 
against Nazis was more protected in the court’s eye than a movement 
against communist views. The discrepancy between these two cases 
show Germany’s perception of speech is inextricably tied to the 
morality of the speech itself. 
Lüth particularly exhibits Germany’s more cherry-picked view on 
free speech. Unlike in the United States, where the court system holds 
fast that speech cannot be judged by its substance,219 German courts 
allow for judgments about the content of the material when it comes to 
unsavory material.220 Another particularly crude example would be a 
lawsuit in which a politician protested comments made about him.221 
Those comments compared him to a “rutting pig,” and were sexual in 
 
211. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 443. 
212. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 444 (“[The] Basic Law is not a value neutral 
document . . . the content of the existing law must also be brought into harmony with this system 
of values.”). 
213. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 448. 
214. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 454. 
215. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 454-55. 
216.  KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 454-55 
217. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 456 (“[T]he freedom of intellectual debate 
is an absolute prerequisite for the functioning of a free democracy. . . .”). 
218. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 456  
219. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 829 
(1995) (“The government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating 
ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.”). 
220. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 462. 
221.  KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 462. 
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nature.222 The German court held that the politician’s dignity 
considerations outweighed the importance of expressing opinions 
about him.223 
Germany’s laws show a country that prioritizes the morality of the 
speech it censors far more than other countries. The ICCPR provides 
for such hate speech and dignity considerations.224 As NetzDG is a bill 
targeted directly at content like a “rutting pig” comment, this context is 
important in understanding why and how Germany enacted NetzDG. 
Germany has staunchly defended NetzDG against multiple 
international attacks by arguing that NetzDG is a protection of German 
civil rights.225 The German government was forced to grapple with the 
repercussions of this legislation when the Special Rapporteur published 
his letter.226 Germany’s reply shows its commitment to the measure to 
prevent hate speech online by pointing out (1) the narrowing tactics it 
used revising the bill; (2) the relevance of the law to problems today; 
and (3) the already present obligation on social media sites to remove 
criminal content.227 
Germany’s language in support of its bill to the Human Rights 
Watch shows their commitment to the idea that NetzDG protects the 
dignity of its citizens.228 It goes on to criticize social media companies 
for being slow to react to the pressing issues of online criminal 
activity.229 These legitimate concerns have plagued governments and 
scholars alike, and Germany’s efforts to combat these problems are 
amongst the most extreme responses. 
 
222.  KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 462. 
223.  KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 464. 
224. See infra Part III. 
225. See Tough new German law puts tech firms and free speech in Spotlight, IRISH TIMES 
(Jan. 5, 2018, https://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/tough-new-german-law-puts-
tech-firms-and-free-speech-in-spotlight-1.3346155 [https://perma.cc/7ZP8-62AZ] (quoting 
Justice minister Heiko Mas saying, “Incitement to murder, threats, insults and incitement of the 
masses or Auschwitz lies are not an expression of freedom of opinion but rather attacks on the 
freedom of opinion of others.”). 
226. See generally Kaye Letter, supra note 19. 
227. German Kaye Response, supra note 20. 
228.  German Kaye Response, supra note 20 (“In 2015, the increasing spread of hate crime 
on the internet (especially on social networks such as Facebook, YouTube and Twitter) became 
ever more serious. Not only hate speech, defamation and malicious gossip were an issue but also 
the spread of ‘fake news.’”). 
229.  German Kaye Response, supra note 20. 
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B. NetzDG Itself 
1. The Text 
NetzDG operates to criminally penalize social media operators for 
the content on their websites.230 The law targets social media in 
particular, as opposed to other internet platforms.231 Specifically, it 
seeks to hinder social media giants.232 It specifically seeks to remove 
slanderous and hateful speech in violation of German law.233 The law 
gives a window of roughly seven days after the post is reported for 
social media providers to decide whether or not a post is in violation of 
NetzDG, and then subsequently to remove it.234 However, if the post is 
“manifestly unlawful,”235 then media providers have twenty-four hours 
to remove the content.236 The bill makes no attempt to define exactly 
what “manifestly unlawful” means.237 NetzDG does cite twenty-one 
different criminal statutes,238 but it makes no attempt to differentiate 
between them.239 For example, the bill does not specify if there is any 
more urgency to removing content propagating terrorist groups that 
content insulting another person. Such key nuances would help social 
media companies and the German public understand which content 
should be prioritized. 
 
230. NetzDG, supra note 7. 
231.  NetzDG, supra note 7. The bill targets websites that “for profit-making purposes, 
operate internet platforms which are designed to enable users to share any content with other 
users or to make such content available to the public. . . .” NetzDG, supra note 7. The legislation 
also specifically carves out “[p]latforms offering journalistic or editorial content . . . [and] 
platforms which are designed to enable individual communication or the dissemination of 
specific content.” Id. As a result, sites like Facebook and Youtube are held liable, but not 
LinkedIn or Whatsapp. 
232. The bill, for example, only requires social media websites who receive more than 100 
complaints per year to report their deletions to the government. See German Kaye Response, 
supra note 20, at 2 (“The obligation to report . . . only applies to platform operators who receive 
more than 100 complaints per year. . . .”). 
233. The bill references several other sections of the German criminal code. They pertain 
to, among other things, dissemination of propaganda for an illegal political party, treasonous 
forgery, incitement of hatred, and defamation. See STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] [PENAL CODE], 
as amended Dec. 31, 2007 (trans. by Michael Bohlander) (Ger.). 
234. NetzDG, supra note 7. 
235. NetzDG, supra note 7. It should be noted that the original German words have been 
translated in several different forms, including, “obviously illegal.” 
236.  NetzDG, supra note 7. 
237. See generally NetzDG, supra note 7. 
238.  NetzDG, supra note 7, art. 1, § 1.3. 
239.  NetzDG, supra note 7, art. 1, § 1.3. 
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NetzDG carries heavy penalties for failure to comply.240 They can 
reach up to EU€5 million.241 Scholars speculate that resulting fines 
could be multiplied to up to even EU€57 million.242 NetzDG also 
includes a reporting requirement.243 Every six months, social media 
providers must submit detailed, public reports on all of the deleted 
content from the last six months.244 
Noticeably lacking in NetzDG is a mechanism for users to 
challenge platforms’ decisions to remove their content.245 The law 
explicitly carves out a mechanism for administrative bodies to review 
social media platforms’ decisions, but no formal mechanism is in place 
for lawful content that has been removed.246 Notably, the users who 
posted the removed materials are not given any way to defend their 
content. 
2. Enforcement 
The news cycle is fast moving, and there is no simple way for 
internet platforms to keep up with the number of hateful comments that 
arise in twenty-four hours without censorship.247 In their six-month 
reports, social media providers overwhelmingly say they have seen 
small numbers of complaints, each site stating it is deleting between 
twenty percent and twenty-five percent of reported content.248 By the 
standards of the German government, it would seem that these 
platforms are doing a careful job monitoring their sites for violations 
of free speech.249 
 
240.  NetzDG, supra note 7, art. 4, § 2. 
241.  NetzDG, supra note 7, art. 4, § 2. 
242. See, e.g., Citron, supra note 18, at 1049. 
243. NetzDG supra note 7, art. 1, § 2. 
244. NetzDG supra note 7, art. 1, § 2. 
245. See NetzDG supra note 7, art. 1, § 2. 
246. Kaye Response, supra note 19. 
247. See Citron, supra note 18, at 1055 (noting that the expenses of content review may 
push internet platforms towards a “presumption of deletion”). 
248. NetzDG Transparency Report, FACEBOOK, https://fbnewsroomus.files.
wordpress.com/2018/07/facebook_netzdg_july_2018_english-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4T4R-
WHXE]; NetzDG Transparency Report, GOOGLE, https://transparencyreport.google.com/
netzdg/youtube [https://perma.cc/8VQA-WW9A]; NetzDG Transparency Statistics, TWITTER, 
https://transparency.twitter.com/en/countries/de.html [https://perma.cc/XF43-HZYJ]. 
249. Lucina Southern, “Before, It Was A Black Box’’: Platforms Report How They Delete 
Illegal Content in Germany, DIGIDAY (Aug. 2, 2018), https://digiday.com/media/black-box-
platforms-report-delete-illegal-content-germany/ [https://perma.cc/6CMC-RP77]. 
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These numbers tell an incomplete story because they do not 
account for the number of posts deleted before reporting.250 A recent 
report documents that from January to June of 2018, Facebook 
removed over two and a half million posts for “violating community 
standards.”251 A sixth of Facebook’s global moderation team is 
committed to the practice, working in what are known as “deletion 
centers.”252 This means Facebook has been removing approximately 
14,000 posts per day since NetzDG went into enforcement. While there 
is not enough transparency to determine how many deletions were 
German deletions, Facebook has confirmed that this number is a direct 
result of “paying attention to the German law.”253 
Thus far, there is little adjudication on the issue, but one example 
shows that courts are amenable to the nuance of the German law.254 
Recently, a poster won a victory against Facebook over a deleted 
comment.255 The Facebook user had posted a newspaper article about 
Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban’s comments on immigrants.256 
The user added his own view that Germans were being “stupid” about 
immigrants and were brainwashed by the media.257 Facebook removed 
 
250. Id. 
251. Douglas Busvine, Facebook Deletes Hundreds of Posts Under German Hate Speech 
Law, REUTERS (July 27, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-germany/
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[https://perma.cc/4JY2-HDG8]. 
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tough-new-german-law-puts-tech-firms-and-free-speech-in-spotlight [https://perma.cc/A9M6-
PBJ2]. 
253. Id. 
254.  Christof Kerman & Johannes Steger, German Court Overturns Facebook 
‘Censorship’, HANDLESBLATT GLOBAL (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.handelsblatt.com/today/
politics/free-speech-german-court-overturns-facebook-censorship/23581834.html 
[https://perma.cc/3GZM-AS2Z]: Peter Muehlbauer, Interim Injunction: Facebook May Neither 
Delete Nor Suspend Legal Comment, TELEPOLIS (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.heise.de/tp/
features/Einstweilige-Verfuegung-Facebook-darf-legalen-Kommentar-weder-loeschen-noch-
sperren-4022958.html [https://perma.cc/YU29-K6YG]; David Meyer, Court Tells Facebook: 
Stop Deleting ‘Offensive’ Comments, ZDNET (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.zdnet.com/article/
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the post and blocked the user.258 The documentation of the case 
(including the identity of the Facebook user) remains confidential, but 
the German court granted a temporary injunction against Facebook, 
reinstating the user’s account.259 The court cited German freedom of 
expression rights as the reason for reinstating the post.260 The victory, 
though one in a sea of uncertainty, may provide a window to the power 
of an enforcement mechanism on the law.261 
IV. NETZDG AS A PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS 
In order to determine whether or not NetzDG is in violation of 
Article 19, it is important to weigh the proportionality of the 
legislation.262 Part III of this Note evaluates Germany’s legitimate aim 
with this legislation,263 and detail the consequences of the legislation 
being too broad.264 It will evaluate whether the consequences of this 
legislation outweigh the legitimate concerns of the German 
government.265 
A. Germany’s Legitimate Aim 
1. Loss of Dignity Online 
The core of NetzDG is based on the right to one’s own dignity and 
honor.266 The right to control one’s personal image is a recognized right 
throughout Europe, and subtly diverges from the right to privacy.267 
NetzDG can promote this goal for the large portion of private citizens 
affected by online harassment, many of whom are not public figures 
and should be legally protected from a large amount of online hate 
speech and defamation. 
 
258. Kerman & Steger, supra note 254; Muehlbauer, supra note 254; Meyer, supra note 
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Indeed, under-regulation of the internet has disastrous 
consequences, as one can see in the United States, a country that does 
not recognize dignity as a right.268 Internet platforms enjoy immunity 
in the United States for the content posted to their sites.269 Because of 
this immunity, anonymous posters may get away with rampant 
mistreatment.270 The individual harassment of people online can be 
emotionally devastating and can lead to severe, and sometimes instant, 
consequences.271 
Beyond the personal consequences of unregulated vitriol online, 
there are broad sweeping consequences for the rise of political groups 
voicing hate speech online.272 Recently in America, there have been 
instances of domestic terrorism that stem directly from online 
instigation.273 For example, in October of 2018 a man walked into a 
synagogue in Pennsylvania and executed the deadliest attack on Jewish 
people in American history.274 The evidence suggests that he was riled 
up by online anti-Semitism.275 
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https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/27/us/synagogue-attack-suspect-robert-bowers-
profile/index.html [https://perma.cc/9FKM-BJD9]; Renatta Signorini & Natasha Lindstrom, 
Suspected Squirrel Hill Synagogue Gunman: ‘Jews are the Children of Satan,’ TRIBLIVE (Oct. 
27, 2018), https://triblive.com/local/allegheny/14220087-74/alleged-synagogue-shooter-jews-
are-the-children-of-satan [https://perma.cc/5BQG-9BZG]. 
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Further, the evermore complicated question arises: what to do 
about “fake news.”276 Fake news rocked the world in 2016 when both 
the United Kingdom and the United States fell prey to mass 
disinformation attacks.277 After thorough investigation, it became clear 
that Russia had targeted both countries, primarily through Facebook, in 
pivotal elections, possibly altering the results.278 
These examples would all present violations of human dignity 
under German law.279 Defaming content is at the heart of German 
constitutional jurisprudence, so the vicious online attacks are definitely 
in violation of those laws.280 Further, the First Amendment may be the 
central protection under American law,281 but protection against hate 
would be of utmost importance to protect against in German law.282 
Even fake news would be in violation. NetzDG claims a reach-around 
sort of protection against fake news, and thus protects against fake 
news aimed at harming minorities.283 Given that human dignity rights 
protect a person’s ability to protect his or her image, the dissemination 
 
276. Ashley Smith-Roberts, Facebook, Fake News, and the First Amendment, 95 DENV. 
L. REV. ONLINE 118, 119-20 (2018).  “Fake news” is now commonly used to refer to the 
proliferation of misinformation on the internet.  Fake news has more of an ability to spread and 
seem convincing because the internet algorithms prioritize “popular” posts, as opposed to well 
researched ones. See James Carson, What Exactly Is Fake News, And How Can You Spot It?, 
TELEGRAPH (Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/0/fake-news-exactly-has-
really-had-influence/ [https://perma.cc/M2GY-8GQA]. 
277. Smith-Roberts, supra note 276, at 119. 
278. See Smith-Roberts, supra note 276, at 119. 
279. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., A Comparative Perspective on the First Amendment: 
Free Speech, Militant Democracy, and the Primacy of Dignity As A Preferred Constitutional 
Value in Germany, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1549, 1584 (2004). These would also violate several sections 
of Germany’s criminal code. The German Penal Code (as amended Dec. 19, 2001) (trans. 
Stephen Thaman, 2002). 
280. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 355. 
281. See, e.g., Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (“[A]ny 
person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could 
from any soapbox . . . the same individual can become a pamphleteer . . . ‘the content on the 
Internet is as diverse as human thought.’”). 
282. Basic Law art. 1(1) (“Human dignity is inviolable. To respect and protect it is the 
duty of all state authority.”); See also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., A Comparative Perspective 
on the First Amendment: Free Speech, Militant Democracy, and the Primacy of Dignity As A 
Preferred Constitutional Value in Germany, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1549, 1553 (2004) (“[F]ree speech 
simply is not the most important constitutional value in the German legal order; instead, pursuant 
to the first clause of the Basic Law, human dignity holds this position”). 
283. See Questions and Answers on the Network Enforcement Act, BUNDESMINISTERIUM 
DER JUSTIZ UND FÜR VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ, https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/FAQ/EN/
NetzDG/NetzDG.html [https://perma.cc/84J4-85CW] (where Germany claims the law combats 
fake news). It is worth noting that there are no provisions of NetzDG that expressly combat fake 
news. See generally NetzDG, supra note 7. 
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of inaccurate news about minority groups implicates human dignity 
rights.284 To this extent, NetzDG is permissible as a protection of 
human rights.285 
2. Terrorism Recruitment Online 
The European Union, the United States, and several other 
countries have struggled to deal with terrorists’ use of the internet for 
recruitment purposes and dissemination of violent content.286 
Terrorism recruitment became a large problem online well before 
NetzDG was enacted.287 The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”), 
for example, has been using social media to globally recruit for almost 
a decade. In 2015, the Brooking Institute estimated that ISIS supporters 
used somewhere between 46,000 and 70,000 twitter accounts in the last 
three months of 2014.288 In 2018, Rukmini Callimachi, the journalist 
who dedicates her life to covering ISIS, noted that there are more 
terrorists in Iraq and Syria alone right now than there were worldwide 
on the eve of 9/11.289 
The evidence suggests that internet companies, for years, were 
negligent in tracking terrorism on their platforms.290 For example, 
when Tashmin Malik posted about her allegiance with ISIS in 2014, 
Facebook removed the post but did not alert the authorities.291 Soon 
after, Malik killed fourteen people in San Bernadino, California.292 
Facebook is even one of the few social media sites proactively 
removing terrorism from their platform in the United States.293 
 
284. See Kraski, supra note 23, at 938 (claiming that insult law would be the best way to 
combat fake news online). 
285. Oster, supra note 62, at 93. 
286. Citron, supra note 18, at 1042. 
287. Flemming Rose participates in the panel, “Panel: Fake news and free speech,” 
hosted by the Alliance of Democracies, CATO INST. (June 22, 2018), https://www.cato.org/
multimedia/media-highlights-tv/flemming-rose-participates-panel-panel-fake-news-free-
speech-hosted [https://perma.cc/Y5KT-N2HW]. 
288. J.M. BERGER & JONATHAN MORGAN, THE ISIS TWITTER CENSUS: DEFINING AND 
DESCRIBING THE POPULATION OF ISIS SUPPORTERS ON TWITTER (2015). 
289.  Caliphate: Chapter One: The Reporter, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018) (downloaded 
using iTunes). 
290.  Susan Klein & Crystal Flinn, Social Media Compliance Programs and the War 
Against Terrorism, 8 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 53, 56 (2017). 
291.  Id. 
292. Id. 
293. Id. at 72. 
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Laws like NetzDG incentivize platforms to shut down online 
terrorism immediately.294 The companies must track an illegal content 
on their platforms, including propagating hate groups.295 Because of 
this requirement, hate groups have no way of congregating online in 
Germany, nor can one read posts from ISIS within German borders.296 
Thus, NetzDG would protect Germany from online radicalization that 
plagues other countries. 
B. The Problems of Proportionality 
1. Facebook and Twitter: Public Actors 
Social media platforms yield the majority of the control over 
which content gets deleted as “hate speech” and which content is 
allowed to remain.297 Traditionally, internet companies tend to 
subscribe to the most radical definitions of free speech.298 At the start, 
the internet pioneers considered their new toy a wild west of speech.299 
John Parry Barlow, one of the original internet crusaders, even went so 
far as to establish an Internet Declaration of Independence.300 Still 
today, many Silicon Valley techies believe they are the true arbiters of 
the market of information.301 
 
294. Alexander Tsesis, Foreword: Terrorist Incitement on the Internet, 86 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 367, 368 (2017). 
295. NetzDG supra note 7, at § 1.3. 
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86, 86a, 89a, 91, 100a, 111, 126, 129 to 129b, 130, 131, 140, 166, 184b in connection with 184d, 
185 to 187, 241 or 269 of the Criminal Code and which is not justified.”). 
297.  VIDUSHI MARDA ET AL., WISDOM OF THE CROWD: MULTISTAKEHOLDER 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE FAKE NEWS DEBATE (Internet Policy Observatory at the Annenberg 
School for Communication, Univ. Penn, eds., 2018). See also Kate Klonick, The New 
Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 
1598, 1608 (2018). 
298.  JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? (Oxford University 
Press, Inc.) (2006). 
299.  Id. at 16. 
300.  Id. at 20 (citing John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of 
Cyberspace, http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html [https://perma.cc/GVC8-
DBN8]). 
301.  See Ashley Smith-Roberts, Facebook, Fake News, and the First Amendment, 95 
DENV. L. REV. ONLINE 118, 124–25 (2018) (“Twitter has declared itself to be the ‘free speech 
wing of the free speech party;’ Facebooks says it is ‘in the business of letting people share stuff 
they are interested in;’ and Reddit promotes itself as a ‘free speech site with very few 
exceptions.’”) 
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This changed in the midst of scandals and pressure from 
regulators (particularly European ones) to reform.302 Internet 
companies suddenly found themselves in the midst of new and decisive 
regulations (NetzDG amongst them).303 As a result, many high-profile 
platforms have publicly committed to enhancing their moderation of 
content.304 
This present large problems in the context of human rights law for 
several reasons: (1) there is little transparency to which content gets 
deleted and why; and (2) because NetzDG’s definitions are so vague, 
social media platforms must make the decisions themselves as to which 
content gets deleted.305 
The HRC is highly deferential to moral differences amongst 
nation states.306 NetzDG, however, presents a novel problem of 
international internet law; it is not the German government, but the 
intermediaries, that are making the decisions of what can be deleted.307 
NetzDG does not give social media platforms a clear picture of which 
content violates German law. As a result, social media providers are 
the ones making the value judgments on what to delete from their 
deletion centers. The intermediaries are some of the most powerful 
actors in the world of information today, governmental or private.308 
2. The Chilling of Political Speech 
NetzDG has a chilling effect on political speech. The extremity 
with which Germany penalizes hate speech may lead those with 
unpopular or inflammatory opinions to refrain from posting. Recently, 
 
302.  Citron, supra note 18, at 1038. On May 31, 2016, Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, and 
YouTube entered into an agreement with the European Commission to remove “hateful” speech 
within twenty-four hours if appropriate under terms of service. 
303.  Citron, supra note 18, at 1038.  
304. See e.g., Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg Meeting With European Parliament, C-
SPAN (May 22, 2018), https://www.c-span.org/video/?446000-1/facebook-ceo-mark-
zuckerberg-testifies-eu-lawmakers [https://perma.cc/5YHB-BAH4] (documenting Mark 
Zuckerberg’s address to Parliament that Facebook would be “fully compliant” with the GDPR). 
305. ARTICLE 19, GERMANY: THE ACT TO IMPROVE ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW IN 
SOCIAL NETWORKS (2017).  
306.  See Siracusa Principles of the ICCPR para. 27, https://www.uio.no/studier/emner/jus/
humanrights/HUMR5503/h09/undervisningsmateriale/SiracusaPrinciples.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z3KS-48U8]  (“Since public morality varies over time and from one culture 
to another, a state which invokes public morality as a ground for restricting human rights, while 
enjoying a certain margin of discretion, shall demonstrate that the limitation in question is 
essential to the maintenance of respect for fundamental values of the community.”). 
307. Article 19, supra note 285, at 16. 
308. Klonick, supra note 297, at 1657. 
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Germany has gone as far as to use its law enforcement to raid the houses 
of posters.309 As part of a pattern of chilling political speech, a Green 
Party candidate in Austria was insulted online and the European courts 
held that the content was illegal and had to be removed.310 
Similarly, under NetzDG, Beatrix Von Storch was insulted online 
and that content was taken down.311 Beatrix Von Storch herself was 
censored for hateful comments against Muslims on Twitter.312 While 
in itself this is not sympathetic, many German ended up running to her 
side.313 The effect is not only the chilling of political speech, but also 
the creation of a sympathetic character on the far right, thus further 
solidifying her views as part of the zeitgeist.314 More sympathetically, 
satirists mocking Beatrix Von Storch had their content taken down, 
chilling creative and political speech.315 
Recently, countries with less noble goals have taken inspiration 
from NetzDG.316 NetzDG can seem acceptable as legislation in a 
country like Germany, which holds itself to a high standard of human 
rights.317 The law is so vague, however, that its language has now been 
co-opted by less good faith users.318 
 
309. Ruth Bender, German Police Carry Out a Nationwide Crackdown on Internet Hate 
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Human Rights and National Sovereignty in Federal Systems: The German Experience, 47 
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Soon after the passage of NetzDG, Russia adopted a law similar 
to the German law.319 “Manifestly unlawful” takes on new meaning 
when it is paired with the intent of the Kremlin.320  Russia, Singapore, 
and the Philippines have all cited NetzDG in pending legislation that 
will limit speech online.321 
These examples grow into even more extreme legislation. Poland 
has passed a law banning speech about Poland’s role in the 
Holocaust.322 Poland, the country famously devastated by invading 
Nazi forces during World War II, has been heavily criticized by the 
international community for its complicity in deaths of the Jewish 
people.323 One of three Jews who died during the Holocaust was 
Polish.324 In 2017, the Polish government passed legislation forbidding 
this criticism.325 After public backlash (including massive outcry from 
Israel), Poland amended the law.326 It removed criminal penalties from 
the statute, but it remains illegal still to speak against Polish 
involvement in the Holocaust.327 
NetzDG has become the impetus not only for troubling censorship 
in Germany itself, but also for global censorship around the world. As 
was specified by the HRC in 2010, protection of free speech on the 
internet is crucial in this day and age to the protection of expression to 
 
319. Vanessa Strizh et al., Russia Introduces New Draft Law on Social Networks, 
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all.328  Media Platforms have become more concerned about limiting 
fake news and hateful content from both an economic and moral 
standpoint.329 NetzDG is an extreme example of how non-American 
jurisdictions have taken aim at widespread, transnational concerns of 
illegal internet content. Another indication of this trend is the recent 
European recent effort to codify the right to be forgotten through the 
GDPR.330 The GDPR has created mass liability for content that begs 
deletion not simply in one country, but worldwide.331 
American speech online also faces more direct challenges in 
foreign courts. Courts in Canada and the United States have seemingly 
gone to war over the issue. Google LLC v. Esquustek Solutions Inc., a 
California court held that a Canadian order to make content globally 
inaccessible was unenforceable in the United States, and ordered an 
injunction.332 When Google returned to Canada with the injunction, the 
Canadian judge held it was still enforceable because it did not compel 
Google to “violate the law.”333 
NetzDG presents the biggest challenge through the internet 
companies’ terms of service.334 The terms of service used by social 
media platforms further show the effect of transnational law on global 
censorship. 335 The European Union recently signed a deal with social 
media providers to ensure the exclusion of Terrorism and Radicalized, 
hateful content on their sites.336 These terms of service to not simply 
apply in the European Union, but globally.337 This is in stark contrast 
to the initial stance of social media companies.338 From the most 
virulent defenders of free speech, to actual requests for self-regulation, 
internet companies have shown a change of heart in the arena of 
regulation. 
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Facebook claims that it looks to whether something is in violation 
of its “community guidelines” and then it evaluates whether it is 
unlawful under NetzDG (in which case it would only be blocked in 
Germany).339 Presuming that that is true, NetzDG still could lead to 
mass international censorship.340 As countries grow more willing to 
regulate internet platforms, social media providers have economic 
incentive to push their terms of services more and more 
conservative.341 Many providers rely partially on geo-blockers,342 but 
prefer to use the mutual assent of a form contract.343 As a result, online 
content grows progressively more censored.344 
C. NetzDG: A Violation of the ICCPR 
In evaluating NetzDG through a balancing test, it seems that it is 
in violation of human rights law because (1) The HRC has specifically 
sought to protect the internet; (2) The statute is not narrow in its speech 
limitation; and (3) It gives all of the power to censor to private actors. 
1. Protected Use of Technology 
The Human Rights Council emphasizes that exceptions to Article 
19 from 19(3) must be narrow, and the main problem with NetzDG is 
that it is vast.345 It does not provide enough guidance for what illegal 
speech is.346 It is vague in its language towards penalties, offenses, and 
reporting requirements.347 
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2. “Manifestly Unlawful” Is Unacceptably Vague 
The German legislature did not elaborate on the meaning of 
“manifestly unlawful within NetzDG.348 it is not a phrase on which 
there is any elaboration in the document. “Manifestly unlawful” could 
thus apply as narrowly as excluding child pornography immediately or 
apply as broadly as excluding Beatrix Von Storch’s comments about 
Muslims. The danger in the vague term lies in its influence on 
platforms; without a clear definition of what must be removed within 
twenty-four hours, social media platforms will over-correct. 
3.  Private Actors and Overreach 
Social media providers do not have a clear definition of 
“manifestly unlawful,” and reporting requirements on NetzDG are 
vague. The text leaves room for opaque practices. Social media 
platforms are thus making the decisions about what constitutes 
“manifestly unlawful” speech, or other speech generally. The German 
government has effectively delegated the task of defining what speech 
is legal to private, transnational actors who are quick to avoid fines. 
This delegation of power means that social media companies are 
determining which speech is legal and which speech is not. 
V. AMERICAN STAKE IN NETZDG 
In order to firmly understand what is at stake in NetzDG, it is 
important to understand the failures of the United States system of 
internet regulation.  The United States has underregulated the internet 
purposefully, but the global nature of social media makes it difficult to 
escape the consequences of foreign regulation.  Section V.A of this 
Note will explain the American approach to regulation.349  Section V.B 
will explore the transnational problems of social media speech 
regulation.350 
A. Section 230 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act indemnifies 
internet companies from any liability for third party content on their 
 
348.  See NetzDG, supra note 7. 
349.  See infra Section V.A. 
350.  See infra Section V.B. 
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platforms.351 Initially, this provision meant to protect good faith 
platforms from liability of plagiarized materials on their sites.352 The 
result reaches much farther.353 
This system presents large problems for accountability on the 
internet.354 Many websites allow for anonymous posting. While this 
allows for many benefits, it also means those involved in illegal posting 
may never be tracked down.355 Generally, this is why countries like 
Germany have targeted internet platforms: the platforms are in the best 
position to prevent the harms. 
B. Failings to Protect People Under the American Approach 
NetzDG effectively censors within German borders, but it is likely 
the chilling nature of the legislation will have a transnational effect. 
Thus, American law may come to clash with NetzDG. For years, 
platforms have worked closer to using internet borders,356 but it is 
becoming increasingly unavoidable to contain one nation’s law against 
another’s. 
Most social media platforms are based in America, and for years 
they have striven to keep themselves in line with free speech laws in 
America, well known as the most liberal with such laws.357 Primarily, 
many internet companies seek to take advantage of Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act, which indemnifies internet companies 
in the United States from facing liability for unlawful content on their 
platforms.358 
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The seminal case on this issue is Yahoo! v. La Ligue Contre Le 
Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme.359 In 2006, Yahoo! found itself subject to 
French laws prohibiting Holocaust denial when it was compelled to 
remove a Nazi memorabilia auction site from any URL accessible in 
France.360 This included yahoo.fr and yahoo.com itself.361 Yahoo! 
sought declaratory relief in the United States to establish that the 
French law was unenforceable in America due to free speech laws.362 
The Ninth Circuit held that Yahoo! had an obligation to make “all 
reasonable (or available) measures” to block the content in France, but 
that the ban was unenforceable in the United States.363 
The fears of global norms on the internet in the Yahoo! court were 
again visited in the Google v. CNIL in the ECJ.364 The French data 
protection authority sought to not only have Google delist websites 
within France, but also worldwide.365 The court rejected France’s 
attempt, stating “there would be nothing to prevent other jurisdictions 
from claiming the same global scope of application for their own laws. 
The result would be a ‘race to the bottom,’ as speech prohibited by any 
one country could effectively be prohibited for all, on a worldwide 
basis.”366 
Yahoo! and CNIL are cases that seek to protect international 
differences on a platform that is increasingly changing.367 Today, these 
goals grow even less realistic as the internet becomes more global.368 
Media platforms have become more concerned about limiting fake 
news and hateful content from both an economic and moral 
standpoint.369 NetzDG is an extreme example of how non-American 
jurisdictions have taken aim at widespread, transnational concerns of 
illegal internet content. Another indication of this trend is the recent 
European recent effort to codify the right to be forgotten through the 
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GDPR.370 The GDPR has created mass liability for content that begs 
deletion not simply in one country, but worldwide.371 
Domestic sovereignty over online content is also facing more 
direct challenges in international courts. Courts in Canada and the 
United States have seemingly gone to war over the issue. In Google 
LLC v. Esquustek Solutions Inc., a California court held that a Canadian 
order to make content globally inaccessible was unenforceable in the 
United States, and ordered an injunction.372 When Google returned to 
Canada with the injunction, the Canadian judge held that the original 
Canadian order was still enforceable because it did not compel Google 
to “violate the law.”373 
The greatest threat to national ability to control content online 
comes from internet companies’ terms of service.374 The terms of 
service that create “community guidelines” for each website do not 
create de jure international norms, but de facto ones. The terms of 
service used by social media platforms further show the effect of 
transnational law on global censorship.375 The European Union 
recently signed a deal with social media providers to ensure the 
exclusion of terrorism and radicalized, hateful content on their sites.376 
These terms of service to not simply apply in the European Union, but 
globally.377 
VI. SOLUTIONS 
Given the overbroad effects of NetzDG, it seems it is in violation 
of Article 19. While Germany’s goals are compelling, they have not 
sufficiently tailored the law to illegal content.378 However, NetzDG is 
legislation attempting to curtail one of the most pressing transnational 
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issues of the twenty-first century.379 While the law must be challenged, 
there is value in preserving parts of it. Part V of this Note will explore 
the different ways to attack NetzDG, as well as the ways Germany 
could tailor the law to come more in line with human rights norms.380 
If Germany can create a nuanced approach to hate speech online, it may 
set a precedent for other countries to follow suit and tackle the growing 
internet radicalization. 
A. Litigation Solutions 
1. Federal Constitutional Court 
Germany’s Federal Constitutional Courts present Germans with 
the opportunity to challenge the bill.381 Under German Basic Law, a 
German citizen could challenge this breach of rights with a civil suit.382 
The suit would give Germany the opportunity to work through the 
problems with NetzDG on its own. 
It seems unlikely the courts in Germany will entirely strike down 
NetzDG. German courts are far more deferential to the legislature than 
American courts.383 In fact, it is explicit that German Constitutional 
Courts do not have the power to make law.384 As such, the Federal 
Constitutional Courts are more ambivalent about striking down 
legislation. 
German courts also are likely to make the type of value judgments 
that would prioritize Germany’s hate speech laws over free expression 
law in the context of bigoted actors.385 NetzDG primarily takes aim at 
speech that German courts do not prioritize.386 It seems unlikely that 
German courts would prove sympathetic to the inflammatory speech 
often at play on social media.387 
 
379. Siva Vadhyanathan, ANTISOCIAL MEDIA (Oxford Univ. Press 2018) (detailing the 
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385. See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 193, at 355. 
386. See NetzDG, supra note 7. 
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2. Regional European Courts 
EU courts could also present an enforcement mechanism that 
would be useful.388 As a regional court of human rights, ECtHR has 
proven effective as a check on the powers of independent nations to 
control the human rights of their people.389 Indeed, some tout the 
European Union as a model for international regional control.390 The 
European court system has more enforcement mechanisms than the 
international court system, and could be a more effective check on the 
power of the German government. 
The European Union has recently proven that protection of 
dignity and privacy is of greater importance than protection of 
inflammatory speech.391 The European Union is also working with 
social media companies to establish measures similar to those in 
NetzDG. The European courts have also established deferential 
treatment of speech laws within each territory.392 
3. The Optional Protocol 
The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) also presents a solution 
because Germany assented to the Optional Protocol.393 This solution 
would give any German citizen with standing the ability to protest the 
new law directly under Article 19.394 Further, in light of the HRC’s new 
emphasis on preventing censorship on the internet, there is a high 
chance that they will be less receptive to NetzDG than any European 
court.395 
However, even if the ICJ enforce this action against Germany, the 
Optional Protocol does not present easy enforcement mechanisms.396 
ICJ rulings do not have the sovereign rule of law of nation states.397 As 
such, enforcement of the ICCPR can range from greatly effective to 
mere formality.398 
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4. Public Pressure 
Despite difficulties of challenging NetzDG in an enforceable 
action to repeal the bill, it is likely Germany will respond to intense 
pressure from international organizations and foreign governments.399 
Germany is deeply committed to individual rights, partially because of 
its history.400 Germany is also committed to maintaining its image as 
the arbiter of human rights.401 This commitment to its image may cause 
Germany to take stock of the public reaction to the bill. Indeed, 
Germany is already considering revising the bill.402 
B. Tailor the Law 
One of the most important ways Germany could solve these issues 
is to tailor the law. If complying with human rights standards requires 
a balancing test, then Germany may be able to narrow the terms of 
NetzDG so that it only regulates the targeted speech necessary to 
promote the dignity interests of German citizens.  This could preserve 
the successful aspects of the law while limiting censorship damage. 
1. Defining “Manifestly Unlawful” 
The most ambiguous and dangerous portion of NetzDG is the lack 
of description of “manifestly unlawful” content.403 This is the only 
content subject to the twenty-four hour removal clause, and therefore 
the most prone to the chilling effects of overcorrection.404 While 
NetzDG defines the statutes which govern hate speech, it gives no 
indication of when something “manifestly” violates one of these laws. 
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Considering NetzDG is a law based in policing speech, a lack of 
specificity can be fatal. 
Germany should clarify in the statute what it means by 
“manifestly unlawful.” This could, for example, pertain to child 
pornography, terrorist recruitment videos, and specific threats. These 
definitions would help social media providers pare down the content 
they delete before reporting, and thus make it easier to distinguish what 
they have time to consider taking down. 
Germany could base the definition of “manifestly unlawful” in 
Article 1 of the Basic Law and to Article 19(3) of the ICCPR. Article 
1 holds human dignity as “inviolable.”405 Article 19(3) allows for 
restrictions on expression when there is a threat to security and the 
public order.406 If the German legislature uses this language, their 
commitment to upholding freedom of expression and dignity will be 
explicit. Further, it will attach NetzDG to previous Court rulings, 
because there is a constitutional history of protecting dignity. Thus, 
“manifestly unlawful content” should be defined as “content that 
violates dignity in such an egregious manner that it materially disrupts 
national security or public order.” Such a definition would give internet 
companies the guidance to delete content that involves violence or 
hateful propaganda, but let them consider more carefully before they 
remove mere insults and satire. 
2. Protecting Art and Political Dissent 
Expressly carving out and protecting artistic expression could 
protect NetzDG as a matter of human rights law. The ICCPR is carries 
extra weight with political speech and artistic expression.407 This 
speech adds value to society.408  Expressly identifying more heavily 
protected speech in the statute could incentivize social media 
companies to proceed with more caution as they delete content, 
particularly that of artists. Arguably the vulgarity of Jan Böhmermann 
and the Titanic are crucial to political discourse online.409 
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C. Collaboration Between Sovereign and Twitter 
The European Union has entered into an agreement with social 
media platforms to attempt to curb the deeper issues of fake news.410 
While this agreement is far from perfect,411 active collaboration 
between social media companies and government entities could be a 
more beneficial way to regulate the internet.412 Mass internet providers 
and social networks are under even more pressure than the government 
to regulate their content.413 
Social media providers also have the option of working on 
technology that better targets hate speech.414 Processes like the ones 
being worked on at the Anti-Defamation League in the United States 
to filter out hate speech more specifically without filtering political 
satire or legal political speech.415 If computer programs can gain 
sufficient nuance to distinguish true hate speech as defined by German 
law, it would save social media providers from the task of deciding 
what speech is illegal themselves.416 
The more extreme solution to this problem is the advent of the 
collective governance solutions – or a collaboration between 
governments and internet companies. As of recent years, there is a 
deficit of government information on the operations online platforms, 
and internet companies, despite hiring counsel, do not have the clarity 
of regulations to help them make determinations.417 This could be 
remedied by more active collaboration between the government and the 
internet platforms creating a system that allows for government 
conceptions of privacy to match with true understanding of the internet. 
Partnering with good faith actors could lead to better remedies for the 
root problem of protecting people online. 
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D. Private Solutions 
Internet companies are creating their own solutions to the 
difficulties of content moderation as well. In the last month, Facebook 
suggested that it could create its own tribunals for users to turn to when 
they wished to have their content restored.418 Facebook suggests the 
body would be independent from the company, and it would render 
judgments as a neutral arbiter.419 This appellate system would solve 
many of the problems with NetzDG.420 Currently, there is not enough 
oversight of content deletion. A tribunal could bring transparency to 
Facebook’s process of deleting, and citizens could have a way to access 
their rights online. However, such a solution would continue to give 
private companies the ability to determine the law.421 It would also not 
solve these problems with Twitter, Google, Youtube, or any other 
massive internet company. It would also be difficult to make it 
completely independent.422 Thus, as a solution it is ultimately flawed. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the brave new world of the internet, human beings have access 
to more information and connection than ever. Bodies of human rights 
law have recognized the inevitable effect of this revolution on our 
human rights. NetzDG is a law that challenges human rights on Internet 
platforms. It also seeks to protect the German people from the fast 
radicalizing hate speech online. These issues around speech require an 
evaluation of human rights law in relation to a new forum of expression 
for the century. Germany, a country deeply committed to the human 
rights of its people, must take care to create a more nuanced approach 
to this law. As of December 2018, the German government has claimed 
modest success with NetzDG, citing the reports from social media 
companies of low deletion rates.423 At the same time, the first 
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constitutional challenge to NetzDG is making its way through the 
Federal Constitutional Court in Germany.424 As the debate continues, 
the international community must watch and see if freedom of 
expression on the internet will prevail in one of its toughest battles yet. 
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